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1. Introduction 
 
A popular explanation for China’s rapid economic growth in recent years has been the dramatic 
increase in the number of private domestic and foreign-owned firms and a decline in the state-
owned sector.  However, it appears that the demise of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
has been greatly exaggerated with evidence suggesting that China’s SOEs are stronger than ever 
(Hsueh 2011).  The common perception was that China’s SOEs acted as a drag on China’s 
productivity growth by absorbing resources and providing little economic value in return (see 
e.g. Jefferson et al. 1992, 1996, 2000, Lardy 1998, Holz 2002, 2003 and Jefferson and Su 2006).  
However, the recent phenomenon of “guo jin min tui” translated as “the state sector advances and 
the private retreats” has again focused attention on the performance of China’s SOEs.1 
 
Although the output share of SOEs is not increasing it has been declining at a much slower rate 
and it is argued that the state is tightening its grip in a number of strategic and some not so 
strategic sectors (Economist 2011a).2  Methods of support used by China’s government includes 
providing cheap credit to local champions, selective rule enforcement and forced consolidation 
(see Hsueh 2011 for details).  In 2008 Fu et al. (2008) estimated that the share of industrial output 
attributable to SOEs fell from 80% in 1978 to just 28% in 2003.  More recently, Unirule Institute 
of Economics put the fall in the state’s share of industrial output at 27% (down from 49% in 
1999) but noticeably only a little lower than the 2003 estimate (Unirule 2011).  For the period 
2002 to 2006 we find that the SOE share of employment (value added) fell from around 28% 
(24%) in 2002 to around 23% (19%) in 2006.  However, surprisingly the share of SOEs as a 
percentage of all firms remains fairly constant at around 14%.  For foreign firms this renewed 
government intervention in support of Chinese companies is a worrying development as Chinese 
SOEs increasingly flex their muscles across the global economy. 
 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold.  First, in the context of the recent trade and 
productivity literature we briefly discuss the history of economic reform in China and the 
                                                            
1 The Fortune top 500 companies for 2011 lists 61 mainland Chinese firms of which 59 are state-owned which is an 
increase from 39/42 in 2010, 19/20 in 2006 and 6/6 in 2003 (Financial Times China 2011). 
2  Whilst strategic sectors such as oil, coal, telecommunications and transport equipment retain a strong SOE 
presence other sectors such as textiles and papermaking have also witnessed an increase in state involvement.  Our 
data support these findings.  Using National Economic Industry Classification (NEIC) 2-digit industries we observe 
that between 2002 and 2006 the contribution of SOEs as a percentage of industry total value added increased in 19 
(Manufacture of leather products), 20 (Manufacture of wood and wood products), 28 (Manufacture of chemical 
fibres) and 41 (Manufacture of instruments and appliances).  The three industries that increased their share of 
employment between 2002 and 2006 were 14 (Manufacture of food products), 20 (Manufacturing of wood and 
wood products) and 28 (Manufacture of chemical fibres). 
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changing role of China’s SOEs.  Second, we compare the productivity of firms that differ in 
ownership structure and exposure to international markets which enables us to examine more 
closely two of the main explanations from the literature for the existence of productivity 
differentials across and between firms with the same ownership.  To do this we measure total 
factor productivity (TFP) for a large sample of over 78,000 Chinese firms for the period 2002 to 
2006.  This period is ideal for our study as it follows a government push at the beginning of the 
century to merge, privatize and restructure China’s remaining SOEs. 
 
Our methodological approach is to use conditional stochastic dominance (SD) tests that allow us 
to examine productivity differentials across the entire distribution of firms.  Although non-
parametric methods have been used before in the study of firm level productivity and trade (see 
e.g. Delgado et al. 2002, Girma et al. 2004a, 2004b and Arnold and Hussinger 2010), as far as we 
are aware this is the first paper to apply this technique to the productivity differentials by type of 
ownership so we are able to understand how ownership influences productivity across the entire 
distribution of firms.  Although it is reasonably well established that there is a positive 
correlation between exporting and higher productivity, what is less well known is how a firm’s 
trade status affects productivity in conjunction with the ownership structure of the firm.  For 
example, do exporting SOEs have higher productivity levels than non-exporting SOEs?  The 
relatively small sample size of previous studies is part of the explanation and is addressed in this 
paper by the use of a large sample of firms. 
 
Our results show that when the international status of firms is not taken into account the 
productivity ordering follows the theoretical predictions and previous empirical results with 
foreign owned firms more productive than domestic and SOEs in that order.  However, when 
we take into account export status, we find that SOEs rise to the top of the productivity 
performers ahead of even foreign exporters.  Interestingly, we find no statistical difference in the 
productivity levels of exporting or non-exporting foreign and Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau 
(HTM) firms in contrast to the large differences for SOEs and domestic firms in China.  What 
our results reveal is that SOEs are not all the same with China’s state-owned exporters 
considerably outperforming others. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we provide a brief review of the 
literature before going on to outline our econometric methodology.  Section three provides a 
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description of the data and some summary statistics whilst section four presents the results.  The 
final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
We begin with a brief overview of economic reform in China and a summary of the changing 
role of the SOE in China (Fernandez and Fernandez-Stembridge 2006 and Brandt and Rawski 
2008 provide a detailed discussion).  SOEs remain crucial to the success of the economic reform 
process started more than three decades ago.  This success is not just economic but encompasses 
the important links between SOEs and the development of a strong financial system and their 
relationship with employment and social welfare.  The relationship between SOEs and the 
Chinese communist party is also important with political considerations often crucial in 
determining how SOE reform was implemented.3 
 
Started by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 a series of economic reforms were put into place to take 
advantage of general market principles.  Although the first stage consisted largely of agricultural 
reform and encouragement for private entrepreneurs it was not until the second stage in the late 
1980s and early 1990s when the Chinese government began to tackle industry which at the time 
was entirely state-owned.  The process included wide-scale privatizations, the removal of price 
controls and reducing the regulatory burden.  Such reforms were considered an experiment on a 
vast scale.  The major concerns were how to create a modern management system, how to 
manage joint ventures, how to create a firm structure that would allow firms to compete 
nationally and internationally and importantly how China was to deal with the surplus labour 
resulting from economic reform (Fernandez and Fernandez-Stembridge 2006). 
 
The three main stages of reform were firstly management reform (1978-1984), secondly, a dual 
track production system (1984-1992) and thirdly, ownership reform (post-1992).  The first stage 
was initiated by the selection of a small number of SOEs who were allowed to keep a proportion 
of their profits to reinvest and innovate.  By 1980 this incentive mechanism was rolled out to 
include over 6,000 medium and large SOEs (accounting for 70% of national industrial profits).  
In stage 2 SOEs were allowed to sell products outside of the state plan with a premium over the 
                                                            
3 A description of the impact of the initial reforms to SOEs in the 1980s and 1990s and the special role SOEs play 
in Chinese society can be found in Hay et al. (1994), Woo et al. (1994), Perkins (1996), Bai et al. (1997), Li (1997), Bai 
et al. (2000) and Steinfeld (2000). 
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state price of around 20% (known as the Dual Track system).  Some hiring decisions were given 
to the firm.  At the end of the second stage formal contractual arrangements between the state 
and SOEs were introduced. 
 
In the third and most dramatic stage SOEs were allowed to be sold to the public or employees in 
a wide-scale overhaul of the structure of firms.  Crucially, in 1995 at the same time as ownership 
reform was moving rapidly the government chose between 500 and 1000 large SOEs to remain 
in government hands.  Garnaut et al. (2006) showed that by the end of 2001, 86% of SOEs had 
been restructured and 70% privatized (either fully or partially).  At the same time there was a 
dramatic increase in the number of private enterprises with the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2003) estimating that the number of private firms rose from 440,000 (16.9% of all firms) 
in 2006 to 1.32 million in 2010 (43.7% of all firms).  SOE reform is now largely complete but the 
effects are still being felt all across China and importantly, large state monopolies persist in 
certain sectors such as banking, telecommunication and petroleum products. 
 
Early studies of China’s SOEs considered how changes in the productivity of SOEs compared to 
that of their non-state-owned counterparts after the major economic reforms of the late 1980s.  
Studies of the growth of TFP conclude that although Chinese SOEs experienced positive TFP 
growth in the late 1970s and 1980s their growth rates were lower than the growth of firms under 
alternative ownership structures (Dollar 1990, Gordon and Li 1995 and Jefferson et al. 1996).4 
 
More recent studies pay attention to explanations of how productivity changes have been 
achieved (Zhang et al. 2001, 2002 and Fu et al 2008).  Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
all three studies show that SOEs in China have the lowest mean productivity levels while Fu et al. 
(2008) show that the changes in productivity are affected by macroeconomic fluctuations and 
central government reforms.  In particular they show that productivity improved in the 1980s 
and 2000s but worsened in the 1990s, possibly as a result of increased competition following the 
initial reforms.  One drawback with DEA is that it does not take stochastic components into 
account hence any random shock is captured by the inefficiency measure.  Nolan and Wang (1999) 
however, present a more positive view and demonstrate that China’s large SOEs actually thrived 
                                                            
4 TFP has been used to evaluate the performance of Chinese firms since the 1980s (Chow 1985 and World Bank 
1985).  However, there remains some debate about the effectiveness of TFP as a measure of productive efficiency 
especially for SOEs because of government imposed objectives and other distortions incompatible with the efficient 
allocation of resources when profit maximization is not the primary objective.  However, by the time of our study 
SOEs are operating under much more transparent rules making measurement of TFP more appropriate. 
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under the state’s policy to promote large businesses as part of a wider policy of strategic 
integration with the world economy.5 
 
One of the central tenets of this paper is the relationship between productivity and firms’ 
exposure to international markets.  Using traditional parametric methods Bernard and Jensen 
(1995) explain productivity differences between exporting and non-exporting firms using 
individual firm-level data for the US.  They find that the labor productivity of exporting firms is 
about one-third higher than non-exporting firm across all plant sizes.  For China, Kraay (2002) 
also employs parametric regression analysis on a panel of 2,105 large and medium-sized 
industrial firms between 1988 and 1992 and shows that when measured with both partial labour 
productivity and TFP, that most Chinese exporters were more productive than the non-
exporters. 6   More recently, using parametric regression methods with more than 70,000 
manufacturing firms between 2001 and 2005 Sun and Hong (2011) show that foreign-owned and 
exporting Chinese firms are more productive.  However, the size of exporter premium is less 
significant for foreign owned firms.7 
 
More recently, productivity heterogeneity among firms with different level of involvement in 
international trade has been studied with non-parametric methods.  Non-parametric stochastic 
dominance (SD) techniques allow us to consider productivity differences across the whole 
distribution of firms (McFadden 1989 and Linton et al. 2005).  They provide a robust 
comparison of the entire productivity distribution between exporters and non-exporters which 
allows the identification of any heterogeneity in the relationship between exporting and the level 
of productivity.  Using a SD test with data from 1,766 representative Spanish manufacturing 
firms between 1991 and 1996 Delgado et al. (2002) reveal a clear superior productivity of 
exporting over the non-exporting firms.  Girma et al. (2004b) apply SD techniques for more than 
3,700 British manufacturing firms for the period 1990 to 1996 and find evidence to support the 
theoretical prediction of productivity orderings for firms at different stage of the globalization 
process.  In particular, they found that when using TFP, the productivity distribution of 
domestic firms that conduct FDI clearly dominates the productivity distribution of domestic 
exporters and non-exporters that do not invest overseas.  What is more, they find that the 
productivity distribution of domestic exporters is higher than that of non-exporters.  Similarly, 
                                                            
5 Although SOEs make up less than 5% of total firms, they are on average 14 times larger than non-SOEs (NBSC).  
The strategy in the late 1990s was known as “zhua da fang xiao” translated as “manage the large and let go the small”. 
6 See Wagner (2007) for a detailed review of the parametric literature. 
7 Sun and Hong (2011) also found that in four out of five specifications that state-owned exporting firms are more 
productive than the domestic exporting firms although the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
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Girma et al. (2004a) show for a large sample of Irish manufacturing firms for 2000, that the 
productivity distribution of the firms invested in other countries stochastically dominates firms 
that do not, regardless of export status.  Most recently, Arnold and Hussinger (2010) compare 
the productivity distributions of 6000 German manufacturing firms between 1996 and 2002 and 
show that the productivity distribution of the FDI firms dominates both the exporting and non-
exporting firms that do not invest overseas and that exporting firms have higher productivity 
levels than the non-exporting firms. 
 
In a more recent literature conditional stochastic dominance tests have been used.  For example, 
Massoumi and Heshmati (2000), Delgado et al. (2002) apply this technique to Swedish income 
distributions and firm productivity and exports respectively.  In our case we condition on 
location, firm size and industry.  Firm size is accepted as an important factor in determining 
productivity (Bernard and Jensen 1995, Blalock and Gertler 2004, De Loecker 2004 and Alvarez 
and Lopez 2005).  Syverson (2011) also points out how TFP differs across industries.  Spatial 
studies of productivity show that firms that are located close to each other have similar 
productivity levels (Ciccone and Hall 1996, Fan and Scott 1996, Fingleton 2001 and Rice et al. 
2006).  This is particularly important for China as it has been shown that most productive firms 
are clustered around the coastal regions where China’s "special economic zones" are located 
(World Bank 2006 and Chen et al. 2011). 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Studies that use traditional parametric regression analysis consider only the first moment (mean) 
of the productivity distribution.  Such an approach allows a comparison of productivity on 
average but does not provide any information on relative productivity levels elsewhere in the 
distribution.  Hence, when the distribution of firm level productivities are sufficiently diverse, the 
relationship observed from an analysis at the mean may not accurately represent the entire 
distribution, which in turn might give inaccurate conclusions regarding productivity differences 
across firms.  Furthermore, when traditional regression methods are applied to the study of firm-
level productivity it assumes that all firms with productivity of a certain level will not export until 
a critical threshold for exporting is met.  This assumption is rather restrictive and unrealistic 
(Girma et al. 2004a and 2004b).  Because non-parametric methods are more general and do not 
just compare the mean and variances in productivity for two different groups of firms but also 
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compares the entire probability distribution it removes the cut-off level for firms to export and 
instead allows firms with the same level of productivity to choose either to export or not. 
 
To understand the complex relationship between productivity, international trade and firm 
ownership we test for first order conditional SD on the productivity distribution of different 
firms in the form of extended two-sided and one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  In the 
SD literature a distinction is often made between first and second degree dominance.  To 
establish a dominance relationship between two groups in the first degree no observations from 
one group should lie to the left of the other group and at least some of the observations in the 
first group of distributions must lie strictly to the right of another distribution.  If this is the case, 
the mean of the distribution on the right would be higher than that on the left.  For example, if 
exporters’ productivity distribution first degree dominates the productivity distribution of non-
exporters’ then necessarily the mean of the exporters’ productivity level is higher than that of 
non-exporters.8 
 
In this paper we apply conditional stochastic dominance techniques conditioning on firm size， 
geographical location and industry.  This is achieved by first regressing individual firm-level TFP 
that has been demeaned by the industry average, against size according to the classification by 
the National Bureau of Statistic of China (henceforth NBSC), its location measured by province 
dummies and controlling for possible industry heterogeneity due to possible clustering of SOEs 
in certain industries by the inclusion of 2-digit industry dummies.  We also include year 
dummies.9  The productivity for each firm is then predicted conditional on size, location and 
industry.  The next stage is to take the difference between the actual and predicted productivity 
which represents the productivity level for each firm after removing the impact of size and 
location differences.  This residual productivity is the variable of interest in our conditional SD 
tests.  The result is a productivity ranking of Chinese firms as if they had identical size and 
                                                            
8 Higher order stochastic dominance tests are sometimes applied in studies of income and stock prices in order to 
compare the impact of two distributions on social welfare or individual utility functions.  Unlike first order 
stochastic dominance that compares the position of two cumulative distributions, second order SD compares the 
areas below these two cumulative distributions up to a given value ω	 ∊ Ը.  Provided that the social welfare or 
individual utility function is convex, second order stochastic dominance can be used to help determine which 
cumulative distribution is more preferable (Kaur et al. 1994, Davidson and Duclos 2000 and Cho et al. 2007).  
However, in the case of productivity analysis, the main interest is the comparison of productivity levels across 
different groups instead of a possible social welfare ranking.  For this reason in this paper we only perform tests for 
first order stochastic dominance. 
9 Although we include 2-digit industry dummies as a control for possible clustering of SEOs in certain industries, as 
a robustness check we also included the number of SOE employees as a share of total industry employees as an 
extra control.  The correlation between the conditional TFP with our initial controls for size, location and industry 
and the results using the extra control is 0.992.  The stochastic dominance results are almost identical. 
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location.  Abadie (2002) and Maasoumi and Millimet (2003) provide an excellent discussion on 
the advantages of using conditional SD tests. 
 
Although a detailed discussion on the methodology and implications of SD tests is beyond the 
scope of this paper we provide a brief summary by way of explanation.  Tests for SD assume 
two sets of strictly stationary and α-mixing samples are draw randomly from two groups of 
productivity distributions, where one sample, ω1,..., ωn is randomly drawn from a cumulative 
distribution Ω1 whilst a second sample  ωn+1,..., ωN is drawn from cumulative distribution Ω2.  If, 
for any given percentile, the observations from Ω1 are at least as large as the observations from 
Ω2 for the same percentile, then the cumulative productivity distribution of Ω1 first degree 
stochastically dominates the cumulative productivity distribution of Ω2.  Put simply, Ω1 first 
degree stochastically dominates Ω2 if Ω1 (ω) - Ω2 (ω) ≤ 0 holds for all ω	 ∊ Ը and the inequality 
holds strictly for at least some observations (ω). 
To test for a possible first degree SD relationship between Ω1 and Ω2 we employ one-sided and 
two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  First, a two-sided KS test is used to test the null 
hypothesis that these two cumulative distributions are significantly different from each other. 
 
ܪ₀:		Ω₁	ሺω		ሻ െ 	Ω₂ሺω		ሻ ൌ 0	for	all	ω	 ∊ Ը	 
ܪ₁:		Ω₁	ሺω		ሻ െ 	Ω₂ሺω		ሻ ് 0	for	all	ω	 ∊ Ը 
 
The test statistic is as follows: 
ܭܵଶ ൌ ට݊݉ܰ maxଵஸ௜ஸே | Ω₁෢ሺω୧		ሻ െ 	Ω₂෢ ሺ		ω୧	ሻ|		 
Where Ω₁෢  and 	Ω₂෢  represent the empirical productivity distribution of the groups Ωଵ and Ωଶ respectively 
and  n and m represents the sample size and N=n+m. 
 
A one-sided KS test is then performed to test for possible first degree dominance.  Specifically, 
we test the hypothesis: 
ܪ₁. ₁:	Ω₁	ሺω		ሻ െ 	Ω₂ሺω		ሻ ൑ 0	for	all	ω	 ∊ Ը	 
ܪ₁. ₂:	Ω₂	ሺω		ሻ െ 	Ω₁ሺω		ሻ ൏ 0	for	all	ω	 ∊ Ը 
 
the test statistic is as follows: 
ܭ ଵܵ ൌ ට݊݉ܰ maxଵஸ௜ஸேሼ Ω₁෢	ሺω୧		ሻ െ	 	Ω₂෢ ሺ		ω୧	ሻሽ		 
10 
 
 
Next the p-values for hypothesis tests are observed.  Note that unlike the earlier studies of Girma 
et al. 2004a, 2004b and Arnold and Hussinger 2010 that assume that the random samples are IID 
distributed in this paper this assumption is relaxed.  Hence, we adopt the method suggested by 
Massoumi and Heshmati (2000) and Linton et al. (2005) that allows general dependences between 
the observed samples by using sub-sample bootstrapping for the p-values.  We bootstrap for the 
two groups separately.  It has been shown by Linton et al. (2005) that bootstrapping with a sub-
sample is more desirable than bootstrapping with the combined sample as it provides a more 
accurate test on the boundary of the null.  Our results are based on a 1,000 sub-sample 
bootstrapping procedure. 10 
The results can be categorized into four types: 
 
1. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis which indicates there is no significant 
difference between these two cumulative distributions. 
2. If we can reject the null hypothesis and the alternative H1.2 whilst the alternative H1.1 
cannot be rejected for the given sample we can conclude that the cumulative 
distribution Ω1 stochastically dominants the cumulative distribution Ω2 in the first 
degree. 
3. If we reject the null hypothesis and the alternative H1.1 but H1.2 cannot be rejected for 
the given sample we conclude that the cumulative distribution Ω2 stochastically 
dominates the cumulative distribution Ω1 in the first degree. 
4. If both the null and alternatives are rejected for the given sample then the two 
cumulative distributions are significantly different from each other but there is no 
clear dominance relationship. 
 
 
4. Description of the data 
 
In this paper we utilize a dataset on more than 78,000 Chinese firms with an annual turnover in 
excess of RMB 5 Million for the period of 2002 to 2006 drawn from annual surveys of 
                                                            
10 The same tests were also performed under the IID assumption where the probability distribution for the test 
statistic can be obtained using asymptotic limiting distribution.  See Smirnov (1933) and Conover (1999) for details.  
The results are similar are available upon request.  As the bootstrapped p-values allow a more general correlation 
between the observed samples, which is more robust than the IID assumption, we only report these values. 
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manufacturing firms carried out by the NBSC as part of the Annual Report of Industrial 
Enterprise Statistics.  Our sample contains approximately 82-87% of total output for the 
majority of industries (NBSC).11  Our data contains detailed information on production, capital, 
labor and a number of financial variables.  To avoid complications as a result of firm births and 
deaths our sample includes only companies that participated in all five years of the monthly 
survey.  A similar approach is adopted by Delgado et al. (2002), Girma et al. (2004a, 2004b) and 
Arnold and Hussinger (2010).12  
 
Following Brandt et al. (2012), to correct for possible coding errors the abnormal observations in 
terms of negative total value added, fixed capital and firms with less than 8 employees have been 
removed prior to our estimation of productivity to ensure the regression generates accurate 
measure for TFP.13  Following the approach adopted by International Study Group on Exports 
and Productivity (ISGEP) (2008) to further mitigate for outliers the top and bottom 1% of 
observations of firm-level productivity have been removed prior to our non-parametric tests for 
stochastic dominance. 
 
We measure productivity using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach.  We use total value 
added as the measure for output, total number of employees as measure for labor, total fixed 
capital for production as measure for capital and the total cost of intermediate input for 
production as measure for intermediate output, which is used as an instrument for capital in the 
regression to mitigate possible endogeneity problems.  All the monetary values are deflated using 
deflators from Brandt et al. (2012).  We further assumed the production function takes a Cobb-
Douglas form.  For notational simplicity we refer to logged relative TFP as firm-level 
productivity. 
 
Following the definitions provided by the NBSC we define four categories of ownership: State-
owned enterprise; domestically-owned, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau (HTM) owned and 
foreign-owned firms.  As a result of the post 1990 reforms that encouraged mergers, 
restructuring, bankruptcy and the privatization of state owned enterprises the result was 
considerably fewer SOEs.  Subsequently, in 1998 the NBSC changed the definition of SOEs to 
include those which the state retains a majority share.  Similarly, foreign and HTM ownership is 
                                                            
11 According to NBSC the original dataset contains 85% to 90% of total output in the majority of industries and our 
sample contains over 97% of the total output from the original dataset.  Although the exclusion of small, non-state 
owned firms biases the sample this bias is considerably less than for other studies of this type. 
12 The exit rate of firms from the survey between 2002 and 2006 is low (less than 0.5%). 
13An example of an abnormal observation would be firm with a negative figure for value added or fixed capital. 
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defined as those firms that are majorty-owned by foreign an HTM entities14.  We further remove 
59 firms that do not have a clear ownership structure.  The final sample is 78,258 firms for each 
of five years giving us a total of 391,290 observations.  All results were re-estimated using the full 
untrimmed sample and the results were broadly consistent.15 
 
[Table 1(a) about here] 
 
Table 1(a) provides summary statistics for our sample of 78,258 firms.  In total we have eight 
different groups of firms, four different ownership types (domestic, SOE, HTM and foreign) 
and two trade types (exporters and non-exporters).  A large majority of the firms in our data are 
domestically owned (44,948).  Around 14% are majority state-owned (10,956) and a little under 
12% of firms are owned by HTM nationals (9,067).  Approximately 11% are majority foreign-
owned (8,285).  Not surprisingly, domestic firms are the largest contributors to total value added 
(52%), followed by SOEs (19%), foreign firms (16%) and HTM firms (12%).  Similarly, when we 
consider ownership type, SOEs are the most capital rich with a total net fixed capital of RMB 
734 million which is almost twice as large as the average for foreign owned firms (RMB 403 
million).  Hence, SOEs are relatively large in terms of fixed capital and are still the second largest 
contributor to economic activity in China.  SOEs also record the highest valued added per firm 
on average (RMB 30.5 million) just ahead of foreign firms (RMB 28.7 million).  For employment 
we can see that SOEs employ considerably more workers on average (544 for SOEs compared 
with 238, 401 and 381 for domestic, HTM and foreign firms respectively).16 
 
In terms of trade, Table 1(a) reveals that over 76% of SOEs do not export.  This figure is a little 
lower for domestic firms (73%) and substantially lower for HTM (30%) and other foreign-firms 
                                                            
14 In this study we use 50% as the lower threshold for foreign and HTM ownership instead of 25% as defined by 
NBSC for tax subsidies.  We believe that the foreign and HTMs owner should have control of business operations 
in order for the firm to benefit from better management. 
15 The majority threshold also applies to the definition of ownership for foreign owned and HMT firms.  Note that 
for company registration and tax purposes any firm that is more than 25% owned by foreign or HTM firms is 
classified as foreign or a HTM firm.  However, to have control over the day to day running of a firm in China in this 
paper we set the threshold to be 51%.  More recently the ownership of firms operating in China has been further 
complicated by investment vehicles called a variable interest entity (VIE) (also known as the “Sina” model) where 
Chinese assets are placed in a Chinese company (run by a Chinese citizen) and the returns are eventually moved to 
an offshore foreign company via a series of contracts involving a foreign firm based in China (Economist 2011b). 
16 State-owned firms are most prominent in 15 (Manufacture of drink), 16 (Manufacture of tobacco), 23 (Printing 
and Reproduction of Recorded Media), 25 (Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel), 26 (Chemical raw materials etc), 27 
(Manufacture of pharmaceuticals), 28 (Manufacture of chemical fibres), 33 (Manufacture casting of non-ferrous 
metals), 36 (Manufacture of special equipments), 37 (Manufacture of transportation equipment) and 41 
(Manufacture of instruments and appliances) with contribution to total industry value added equals 22%, 97%, 28%, 
41%, 26%, 29%, 26%, 26%, 36% and 21% respectively. 
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(28%).  The overall percentage of Chinese firms that export is 36%.  This compares with 34% of 
Chinese firms (Sun and Hong 2011), 31% of German firms (Arnold and Hussinger 2010), 84% 
of UK firms (Girma et al. 2004b), 41% of Spanish firms (Delgado et al. 2002), 68% of Irish firms 
(Girma et al. 2004a) and 68% of Chinese firms (Kraay 2002) although it must be noted that these 
studies used different sampling techniques with datasets containing only large firms (often based 
on different definitions of “large”).  With the exception of Sun and Hong (2011), the average 
firm in our dataset can be considered small.  Hence, care must be taken when making direct 
comparisons of this type. 
 
The top row in Table 1(a) is a measure of TFP again broken down by ownership and trade 
status.  To mitigate the problem of omitted variable bias associated with OLS estimates of TFP 
we use the IV estimation procedure provided by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  The production 
function estimated by the Levinsohn and Petrin method shows the average coefficient is about 
0.24 for labour and 0.21 for capital which are significant at the 1% level for all industries in the 
sample.  Wald tests reject the null hypotheses of constant return to scale in majority of cases.  As 
part of our sensitivity analysis we also calculate an alternative measure of productivity proposed 
by Buettner (2003).  The raw correlation between these two measures is approximately 0.7.  As a 
further sensitivity check we also re-estimated our results using a repeated random 10% sample of 
firms.  To control for possible yearly fluctuations in productivity we compare the distribution of 
productivity for each year separately.  To account for variation across industries, relative 
productivity measures are constructed by standardizing the log value of TFP by the 
corresponding 2-digit ISIC industry productivity average.  Results using our random sample 
methodology and the Buettner (2003) measure of TFP are available upon request.  Results were 
generally consistent. 
 
In terms of ownership, Table 1(a) reveals that foreign-owned firms have the highest average 
productivity levels followed by HTM-owned firms.  SOEs still appear to be more productive on 
average than domestic firms.  When we compare exporters and non-exporters however it is clear 
that this result is driven by very high average productivity levels for SOE exporters (who have 
the highest recorded average productivity of all eight possible ownership-trade combinations) 
between 2002 and 2004 followed more predictably by foreign exporters, foreign non-exporters, 
HTM exporters and domestic exporters. 
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As a result of the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, although the contribution of SOEs 
to the Chinese economy was reduced dramatically, in some key and strategic sectors their 
presence is still very noticeable.  In Tables 1(b) and 1(c) we report TFP, employee and value 
added numbers for all firms, SOEs, exporters and SOE exporters for each 2-digit manufacturing 
industry in China for our sample period.  The results indicate a significant presence of SOEs (in 
terms of the number of firms, the number of employees and value added) in industries such as 
the Manufacturing of Drink; Tobacco; Oil processing; Chemical materials; Pharmaceuticals; 
Non-ferrous metals; Special equipment; and Transportation equipment.  The average firm-level 
TFP of SOEs in these industries is generally higher than the national average.  Tables 1(b) and 
1(c) also report the average TFP, employee numbers and value added for all exporting firms and 
exporting SOEs across different 2-digit industries.  Table 1(b) indicates that for the majority of 
industries, exporting firms have a higher than average TFP which is consistent with the earlier 
literature on the superior performance of exporting firms (see Delgado et al. 2002 and Girma et 
al. 2004b).  Furthermore, it indicates that exporting SOEs have a higher TFP than SOEs in 
general and have a higher TFP than the average exporting firm in 26 out of 30 2-digit industries. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Our conditional SD results with bootstrapped p-values are provided in Tables 2(a) and 2(b) and 
3(a) and 3(b) which present pair wise comparisons of the productivity distributions by state, 
domestic, HTM and foreign-owned firms with and without participation in international 
markets.  The first three columns of each table report the result for all firms regardless of trade 
status.  Columns 4, 5 and 6 present the exporter results and the final three columns provide the 
results for non-exporting firms. 
 
[Table 2a and 2b about here] 
 
In line with conventional expectations, the first three columns of tables 2(a) and 2(b) show that 
when we examine all firms together with no consideration of trade status, the distribution of 
SOEs’ productivity does not dominate the productivity distribution of the other ownership types 
(top left box in Table 2(a)).  When we consider SOE productivity against each ownership type 
separately we observe that the productivity distribution of the SOEs is below the distribution of 
foreign owned firms in three out of six years.  This means that for any given percentile of firms, 
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on average SOEs have a lower productivity than the foreign firms.  While the productivity 
distribution between the SOEs and the domestic owned firms and between SOEs and HTM 
firms are significantly different from each other, there is no clear conclusion regarding which one 
dominates.  Figure 1 summarizes the entire productivity distribution of all four ownership for 
the period 2002-2006. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As we can see, the cumulative distribution of SOEs lies entirely to the left of the cumulative 
distribution of foreign-owned firms, which means that for any given percentile, SOEs have lower 
productivity than the foreign firms across the whole distribution.  One of the benefits of the 
stochastic dominance approach is that when we compare the productivity of SOEs against HTM 
owned firms we can see that the productivity of SOEs are lower for the bottom 80% but not for 
the top percentiles (above 80%) where the two lines cross in figure 1.  This is in line with the KS 
test results that the productivity differences between the SOE and HTM are statistically different 
for the whole distribution, but there is no clear dominance relationship.  Similarly, the 
productivity order between SOE and domestic firms is not clear.  These two productivity 
cumulative distributions intercept around the middle percentile which shows that the 
productivity levels of SOEs are lower than domestic firms for the low productive firms but 
higher for more highly productive firms.  This is again confirmed by KS test results which show 
that although the productivity distribution of the SOE and domestic firms are significantly 
different from each other, but there is no clear dominance relationship. 
 
The results are similar when we consider non-exporters only.  The last three columns of Tables 
2(a) and 2(b) reveal that the productivity levels of non-exporting SOEs lie below the productivity 
distribution of foreign firms for all years and HTM non-exporting firms for five out of six years.  
And there is no clear dominance relationship between the SOEs and domestic Chinese non-
exporting firms in terms of their productivity.  In other words, non-exporting SOEs are generally 
less productive than other non-exporting firms in China.  This result can be seen in Figure 2 
which shows the cumulative distribution of SOE lies entirely to the left of both foreign and 
HTM firms for the period 2002-2006.  However, yet again the relationship between the state and 
domestic owned firms is less clear.  In particular, for the entire sample period, domestic are only 
more productive in the low productive percentiles (below 80%) but less productivity for the top 
20 percentiles. 
16 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
However, there is an interesting result when we only consider exporting firms.  In this case, from 
the middle three columns of Tables 2(a) and 2(b) we see that the productivity of SOE exporters 
dominates the productivity distribution of all other types in at least one year between 2002 and 
2004.  For any given percentile of exporting firms, the SOEs have a higher productivity level 
than foreign and HTM firms from 2002 to 2004, and for the domestic firms in 2003.  This can 
be seen from the significant results in each pair wise case and can also be seen in Figure 3 which 
shows apart from domestic firms at the bottom 10 percentiles, the productivity distribution of 
SOEs lie to the right of all other types of ownership between 2002 and 2004.  However, from 
Figure 4 we can see that the calculative productivity distribution curves intercept at around 10 
percentile, which means for the low productivity firms (bottom 10%) the SOEs are less 
productive than the other three types of ownership in 2005 and 2006.  This is confirmed by our 
KS test results as shown in Tables 2(a) and 2(b) and that the overall there is no clear dominance 
relationship of SOEs over the others. 
 
[Figure 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) provide results for comparisons between domestic, foreign and HTM 
owned firms.  Our results show that foreign-owned firms are more productive than both 
domestic and HTM owned firms in almost all cases while the relationship between the 
productivity of HTM-owned and domestic-owned firms is less clear especially for exporters 
where the domestic firms dominate in 2003, 2004 and 2005.  This is shown in Figures 1 to 4.  
One possible reason for the absence of a difference in the level of productivity between 
domestic and HTM firms might be explained by the fact a large number of HTM firms are 
owned by Chinese mainland residents who register the company in Hong Kong and reinvest 
back into China (round-tripping FDI) in order to take advantage of the a more favourable tax 
treatment.  As these firms are de facto domestic firms it is understandable that their productivity 
levels would not be significantly different from the firms that are registered as domestic. 
 
The presence of strong performing SOEs that can be observed from Table 2(a) and (b) and 
implies that the productivity ranking among firms of different ownership types differs 
significantly and is dependent on participation in international trade.  To get a better 
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understanding of this relationship we now make a pair wise comparison between exporters and 
non-exporters contingent on ownership type.  The results are presented in Table 4 and shows 
that when we compare all firms together without considering ownership, the productivity of 
exporters first degree stochastically dominates non-exporters in all years which confirms the 
theoretical predictions of Helpman et al. 1994 and the findings by earlier studies. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
However, when different ownership structures are taken into account, the relationship between 
the productivity and involvement in international markets become more complex.  In particular, 
Table 4 reveals only the state and domestic-owned exporters have a higher productivity than 
non-exporters across all percentiles.  On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of a 
productivity advantage (i.e. productivity premium) for exporting firms when they are either 
foreign or HTM owned (which matches the findings of Sun and Hong 2011 using parametric 
regression).  This demonstrates the importance of ownership and international trade in 
determining the relative productivity advantage across firms. 
 
A sensitivity analysis of our results carried out using the same tests for a measure of TFP 
suggested by Buettner (2003), full samples without deleting the outliers and a randomly drawn 
10% sample from our dataset support our earlier findings.  We find that exporting SOEs have 
higher productivity than all the other types in most cases while for non-exporting SOEs their 
productivity levels tend to be lower than foreign or HTM owned firms. 
 
Tables 1 (b) and 1(c) reveal considerable industry heterogeneity in terms of the sectoral 
concentration of SOEs in Chinese manufacturing.  The conditional TFP used in our analysis is 
the residual firm-level differences in TFP after controlling for 2-digit industry specific effects and 
hence should filter out the effect of relative clustering of SOEs in industries on firm-level TFP.  
To ensure that the key result that exporting SOEs perform better than other exporters is not 
being driven by industries with a high concentration of SOEs we included the number of SOE 
employees as a share of total industry employees as an additional control.  The correlation of 
these two conditional TFP is over 0.90 and the stochastic dominance results also continue to 
support the superior performance of SOEs over other exporting firms.  The results are reported 
in Table 5.17 
                                                            
17 We would like to thank an anonymous referee and the editor for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
As a further test for robustness we separate our industries into two groups, SOE clustered and 
SOE non-clustered industries as a further check that our results are not driven by the clustering 
of SOEs in certain sectors.  An industry is classified as SOEs clustered if the share of SOE 
employees as a percentage to total employees in the industry is in excess of the national average 
for our sample period (25%).  The results are consistent with our main observations and indicate 
that the superior performance of exporting SOEs is not a result of the clustering of SEOs within 
key strategic industries.  As a further check we also included the total number of SOEs in each 
industry as a measure of within industry clustering where an industry is classified as SOE 
clustered if the share of SOEs in the industry is in excess of the national average of 14%.  The 
results were again similar.  We do not report these results for reasons of space but they are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we utilize a non-parametric test of conditional SD to examine the impact of firm 
ownership and trade structure on productivity using a large sample of Chinese medium and large 
manufacturing firm between 2002 and 2006. 
 
Our results reveal that trade status, especially for Chinese SOEs, has a large impact on 
productivity between 2002 and 2004, however this productivity premium disappeared after 2005.  
We show that although foreign-owned firms are more productive than non-exporting firms, 
exporting SOEs are the most productive of all possible groupings of firms.  There are a number 
of explanations including the substantial levels of support that the Chinese government gives to 
national champions including grants for research and development, preferential import 
regulations and priority loan approvals.  These factors enable Chinese SOEs to have greater 
access to foreign technologies and not to be bound by financial constraints which in turn 
encourages greater investment in new technologies and innovation, hence improves productivity. 
 
Furthermore, state ownership itself might be the reason for the higher productivity for exporting 
firms.  It is well understand in theoretical literature that the main objective of FDI is to maximize 
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profits by gaining market access and/or reducing production costs (Helpman et al. 1994 and 
Head and Ries 2003) which means that foreign and HTM firms make investment decisions based 
primarily on future profits.  This is also true for privately owned domestic firms.  However, 
investment by SOEs can be based on a different set of motives and may be purely strategic to 
promote future growth and to facilitate spillovers from the state to the private sector.  This 
motivation could be especially true for large SOEs. 
 
Higher productivity of exporting SOEs could also be a result of increased competition from the 
exposure to international markets.  It has been shown theoretically and empirically that the 
productivity of exporters is closely linked to the level of competition in the market (Levinsohn 
1993, MacDonald 1994 and Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001).  If SOEs export to high income 
countries, whilst others export primarily to developing countries, then the higher levels of 
competition from exposure to high income country markets will force SOEs to improve their 
productivity levels. 
 
There are two alternative explanations for the higher levels of productivity for SOEs in 2002 and 
2004.  The first explanation is possible "creative accounting" by foreign and HTM firms 
operating in China undertaken to minimize tax liabilities.  If firms that import large amounts of 
intermediate inputs artificially increase the price of inputs, it will reduce profits in China by 
overstating the cost of inputs which as a consequence would generate a downward bias on our 
measure of productivity.  This may be an explanation for why no clear productivity advantage 
was identified for exporting foreign and HTM firms which are more able to implement transfer-
pricing. 
 
The second explanation is that the superior productivity enjoyed by SOEs between 2002 and 
2004 may well be a result of distortion in the export structure of firms where the majority of 
exporters from non-state owned firms are concentrated in "process trade" which is low in value 
added and hence generates a low value of TFP.  Hence, it is possible that the observed SOE 
productivity premium could represent an imbalance between the state and non-state owned 
firms in their involvement in the global value chain.  Investigation of these important 
explanations as well as possible deterministic factors for superior productivity by exporting 
SOEs observed in this study remains a topic for future research. 
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Figure 1: SOE versus all other ownership structures 2002-2006 
 
 
Note: The figure is for logged relative TFP to 2-digit industry average 
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Figure 2: Non-exporters by ownership structure 2002-2006 
 
 
Note: The figure is for logged relative TFP to 2-digit industry average 
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Figure 3: Exporters by ownership structure 2002-2004 
 
 
Note: The figure is for logged relative TFP to 2-digit industry average 
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Figure 4: Exporters by ownership structure 2005-2006 
 
 
Note: The figure is for logged relative TFP to 2-digit industry average 
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics (total number of firms 78,258 for the period 2002-2006) 
SOEs
 All Firms (Firm No. 10,956) Exporters (23.40%) Non-exporters (76.60%)
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
TFP 0.87 1.05 0.001 5.999 1.42 1.33 0.001 5.999 0.70 0.87 0.001 5.999
Employment 544 979.28 20 11364 1078 1460.81 20 11364 403 672.53 20 11193
Export Value  11.9 62.86 0.000 1,524 50.7 122.15 0.001 1,524 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.000
Value Added 30.6 82.41 10 2,045 61.5 117.46 22 1,995 21.5 64.74 10 2,045
Fixed Capital 73.4 205.42 1.0 3,702 155.9 318.02 1.5 3,702 48.2 146.58 1.0 3,568
Domestic Firms
 All Firms (Firm No. 44,948) Exporters (27.18%) Non-exporters (72.82%)
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
TFP 0.78 0.81 0.001 5.999 0.90 0.89 0.001 6.000 0.73 0.76 0.001 5.997
Employment 238 377.28 20 11325 347 528.78 20 11115 197 290.39 20 11325
Export Value 8.5 34.31 0.0 1,494 31.1 60.22 1.0 1,494 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.000
Value Added 14.6 28.91 22.0 1,349 18.8 34.60 39.0 907 13.0 26.31 22.0 1,349
Fixed Capital 15.3 48.68 1.0 3,855 20.1 59.69 1.0 2,445 13.5 43.74 1.0 3,855
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau (HTM) Firms 
 All Firms (Firm No. 9,067) Exporters (69.68%) Non-exporters (30.32%)
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
TFP 0.92 0.92 0.001 5.993 0.92 0.92 0.004 5.993 0.90 0.92 0.001 5.988
Employment 401 624.42 20 10988 478 703.21 20 10988 221 316.56 20 7530
Export Value 39.7 91.61 0.0 1,530 56.9 105.27 1.0 1,530 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.000
Value Added 19.3 33.47 15.0 643 20.1 34.40 65.0 643 17.2 31.15 15.0 597
Fixed Capital 24.2 68.48 1.0 3,126 24.9 72.23 3.0 2,995 22.3 58.92 1.0 3,126
Foreign Firms
 All Firms (Firm No. 8,285) Exporters (71.57%) Non-exporters (28.43%)
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
TFP 1.14 1.09 0.003 5.998 1.15 1.09 0.003 5.994 1.11 1.08 0.004 5.998
Employment 381 617.19 20 11125 432 678.08 20 11125 252 395.66 20 10588
Export Value 50.8 124.72 0.0 1,531 71.0 142.49 1.0 1,531 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0
Value Added 28.7 48.00 34.0 1,220 29.6 49.69 64.0 1,220 26.2 43.36 34.0 569
Fixed Capital 40.3 107.55 2.0 3,768 41.4 114.99 2.0 3,768 37.5 85.96 10.0 2,235
Export Value, Value Added and Fixed Capital are measured in ¥1million. 
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Table 1(b): Average relative TFP for Chinese manufacturing firms by 2-digit industry (average of 2002-2006)  
  
 
 Relative TFP2. 
NEIC (National Economic Industrial 
Classification) 
Total 
number of 
firms 
SOEs (%)1 Exporters (%) 
SOEs that 
export (%) All firms SOE Exporter SOE exporter 
13 Manuf. agricultural products. 3,933 13 27 11 0.82 0.60 0.89 1.03 
14 Manuf. food products 1,827 14 31 19 0.77 0.63 0.91 1.14 
15 Manuf. drink products 1,277 19 17 13 0.81 0.79 0.93 1.31 
16 Manuf. tobacco 73 74 15 17 0.92 1.12 1.79 2.01 
17 Manuf. textile 6,744 5 49 48 0.89 1.12 1.00 1.48 
18 Manuf. apparel, footwear etc. 3,765 3 72 44 0.87 0.82 0.88 0.93 
19 Manuf. leather products, fur etc. 1,951 1 72 47 0.85 0.80 0.88 0.94 
20 Manuf. wood and wood products 1,082 9 40 18 0.85 0.74 0.88 1.28 
21 Furniture manufacturing 857 5 53 27 0.86 0.52 0.98 0.85 
22 Manuf. pulp and paper 2,521 5 15 8 0.81 0.87 1.06 1.18 
23 Printing and reproduction media 1,823 33 11 3 0.79 0.61 1.16 1.09 
24 Manuf. cultural, education, prod. 1,188 4 82 47 0.87 0.81 0.90 1.29 
25 Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel 466 15 09 21 0.91 1.44 1.30 1.94 
26 Chemical raw materials etc. 6,174 12 27 28 0.80 1.06 1.06 1.56 
27 Manuf. pharmaceuticals 1,987 17 28 27 0.84 0.97 1.08 1.52 
28 Manuf. chemical fibres 406 10 21 28 0.88 1.29 1.11 1.63 
29 Manuf. rubber products 1,033 7 41 33 0.74 0.87 0.91 1.43 
30 Manuf. plastic products 3,709 5 38 15 0.84 0.73 1.01 1.15 
31 Manuf. non-metal products 6,912 12 19 10 0.85 0.84 1.07 1.43 
32 Manuf. and casting of ferrous metals 1,566 08 15 22 0.81 1.04 1.21 1.79 
33 Manuf. casting of non-ferrous 
metals 1,533 12 24 37 0.86 0.99 1.17 1.27 
34 Manuf. Metal products 3,992 7 38 28 0.81 0.86 0.92 1.48 
35 Universal equipment manufacturing 5,966 12 33 30 0.80 0.94 1.03 1.51 
36 Manuf. of special equipment 3,056 18 29 26 0.82 0.88 1.11 1.61 
37 Manuf. transportation equipment 3,686 20 28 27 0.78 0.95 1.11 1.67 
39 Manuf. electric machines etc. 5,003 08 38 28 0.79 0.82 0.92 1.28 
40 Manuf. telecom equipment etc. 2,720 14 60 42 0.79 0.85 0.89 1.13 
41 Manuf. instruments and appliances 1,298 16 52 29 0.77 0.79 0.82 1.21 
42 Manuf. arts and crafts and other 
manuf. 1,638 5 75 20 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.83 
43 Recycling of waste and scrap 69 5 5 0 0.80 1.12 0.70 0.00 
All industries 78,258 14 45 24 0.82 0.87 0.97 1.42 
Source: Author’s own calculations.  Note: 1. SOEs as a percentage of all firms.  2 Average firm-level TFP relative to the industry average. 
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Table 1(c): Average firm-level employment and value added in Chinese manufacturing firms by 2-digit industry (average of 2002 – 2006) 
Employees Value added1. 
NEIC (National Economic Industrial 
Classification) All firms SOE SOE (%) Exporters
Exporter 
(%) 
SOE 
exporter 
SOE 
exporter (%) All firms SOE SOE (%) Exporter 
Exporter 
(%) 
SOE 
exporter 
SOE 
exporter (%) 
13 Manuf. agricultural products 202 218 14 290 39 492 3 18.26 15.58 11 22.59 33 37.01 3 
14 Manuf. food products 256 303 16 334 40 597 6 17.99 17.18 13 23.67 40 37.33 5 
15 Manuf. drink products 317 481 29 312 17 584 5 30.27 34.91 22 37.23 21 60.74 5 
16 Manuf. tobacco 712 842 88 1160 24 1240 22 244.6 320.01 97 575.94 34 663.29 35 
17 Manuf. textile 367 1109 16 465 62 1633 12 15.4 29.69 11 19.05 61 43.85 8 
18 Manuf. apparel, footwear etc. 366 542 5 399 78 571 2 11.87 13.91 04 12.41 75 16.28 2 
19 Manuf. leather products, fur etc. 491 488 1 567 83 517 1 16.1 15.24 1 17.25 78 17.71 1 
20 Manuf. wood and wood products 215 401 16 251 47 608 4 10.62 13.62 11 11.32 42 25.03 4 
21 Furniture manufacturing 273 212 4 366 71 378 2 12.36 7.88 4 15.79 67 15.68 2 
22 Manuf. pulp and paper 211 436 11 318 22 1152 2 12.54 19.54 8 18.82 22 33.75 1 
23 Printing and reproduction media 172 176 33 321 21 249 1 9.07 7.56 28 16.44 20 16.05 2 
24 Manuf. cultural, education, prod. 462 343 3 513 91 546 2 13.27 12.41 4 14.33 89 22.79 3 
25 Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel 424 971 35 1179 25 1796 14 61.52 159.88 41 145.55 22 281.99 15 
26 Chemical raw materials etc. 236 661 34 350 40 1088 16 18.88 39.22 26 30.04 42 68.29 13 
27 Manuf. pharmaceuticals 312 491 27 460 41 911 14 29.36 41.02 24 44.08 41 76.66 12 
28 Manuf. chemical fibres 347 1337 39 716 43 2906 24 29.74 87.14 29 52.03 37 144.71 14 
29 Manuf. rubber products 341 660 14 513 61 1055 7 15.52 24.23 11 22.27 58 46.84 7 
30 Manuf. plastic products 206 253 6 312 57 524 2 11.71 12.16 5 16.11 52 24.39 1 
31 Manuf. non-metal products 273 443 19 374 26 967 4 13.41 17.09 15 18.78 26 38.16 3 
32 Manuf. and casting of ferrous metals 335 1,033 26 591 26 1893 11 34.97 77.95 2 66.25 28 163.06 9 
33 Manuf. casting of non-ferrous metals 295 853 34 574 47 1394 21 29.83 63.23 26 58.71 47 102.91 16 
34 Manuf. Metal products 223 362 11 327 56 678 6 12.53 18.33 1 16.71 51 40.5 6 
35 Universal equipment manufacturing 256 556 27 375 48 982 14 14.17 22.84 2 21.66 50 43.32 11 
36 Manuf. of special equipment 297 588 36 479 46 1178 19 17.14 24.69 26 28.14 47 54.08 15 
37 Manuf. transportation equipment 378 790 43 626 46 1509 22 21.23 37.38 36 37.28 48 77.19 20 
39 Manuf. electric machines etc. 294 485 13 479 62 1031 7 19.76 26.84 1 27.73 54 56.08 6 
40 Manuf. telecom equipment etc. 527 612 16 705 81 928 10 35.15 45.9 18 45.71 79 73.18 12 
41 Manuf. instruments and appliances 305 412 22 414 70 786 12 15.22 19.51 21 18.34 62 36.05 11 
42 Manuf. arts and crafts and other manuf. 360 507 7 398 83 593 2 11.56 18.7 8 12.05 78 17.33 1 
43 Recycling of waste and scrap 164 90 3 72 2 0 0 11.23 14.79 6 10.5 4 0 0 
All industries 299 544 25 437 59 1078 12 17.84 30.59 20 23.51 56 61.49 1 
Source: Authors own calculations.  Note:1. Value Added is measured in ¥1million 
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Table 2(a) Tests for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (SOE versus All other firms and Foreign owned firms) 
SOEs vs All 
other  
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions  
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Other firms 
dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Other firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Other firms 
dominate 
2006  0.122 
(0.000)  
0.122 
(0.000) 
-0.032 
(0.000) 
0.181 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.181 
(0.000) 
0.151 
(0.000) 
0.165 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.00) 
2005 0.129 
(0.000) 
0.129 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
0.172 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.000) 
-0.172 
(0.000) 
0.158 
(0.000) 
0.158 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
2004 0.125 
(0.000) 
0.125 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
0.190 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.067)** 
-0.190 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
2003 0.122 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0.000) 
-0.047 
(0.000) 
0.193 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.157)*** 
-0.193 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
2002 0.106 
(0.000) 
0.106 
(0.000) 
-0.089 
(0.000) 
0.267 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.014)* 
-0.267 
(0.000) 
0.137 
(0.000) 
0.137 
(0.000) 
-0.052 
(0.000) 
SOEs vs 
Foreign  
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Foreign firms 
dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
2006 0.183 
(0.000) 
0.183 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.023)* 
0.102 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.102 
(0.000) 
0.227 
(0.000) 
0.227 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.933)*** 
2005 0.174 
(0.000) 
0.174 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
0.102 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.102 
(0.000) 
0.235 
(0.000) 
0.235 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.239)*** 
2004 0.167 
(0.000) 
0.167 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.115)*** 
0.112 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.304)*** 
-0.112 
(0.000) 
0.248 
(0.000) 
0.248 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.614)*** 
2003 0.156 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.022)* 
0.114 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.110)*** 
-0.114 
(0.000) 
0.233 
(0.000) 
0.233 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.797)*** 
2002 0.116 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
(0.000) 
0.194 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.091)** 
-0.194 
(0.000) 
0.180 
(0.000) 
0.180 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.167)*** 
1. P-value in brackets.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level respectively. 
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Table 2(b) Tests for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (SOE versus Domestic and HTM owned firms) 
SOEs vs 
Domestic 
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
2006 0.114 
(0.000) 
0.114 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.000) 
0.195 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.195 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.000) 
2005 0.125 
(0.000) 
0.125 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.000) 
0.188 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.000) 
-0.188 
(0.000) 
0.155 
(0.000) 
0.155 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
2004 0.122 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0.000) 
-0.050 
(0.000) 
0.213 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.005) 
-0.213 
(0.000) 
0.154 
(0.000) 
0.154 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.000) 
2003 0.120 
(0.000) 
0.120 
(0.000) 
-0.067 
(0.000) 
0.216 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.021)* 
-0.216 
(0.000) 
0.153 
(0.000) 
0.153 
(0.000) 
-0.028 
(0.000) 
2002 0.118 
(0.000) 
0.118 
(0.000) 
-0.105 
(0.000) 
0.299 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.299 
(0.000) 
0.135 
(0.000) 
0.135 
(0.000) 
-0.069 
(0.000) 
SOEs vs HTM  All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
Dominate 
H1.2:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
2006 0.130 
(0.000) 
0.130 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
0.229 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.001) 
-0.229 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.133)*** 
2005 0.128 
(0.000) 
0.128 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.000) 
0.208 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.208 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.000) 
0.169 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.027)* 
2004 0.126 
(0.000) 
0.126 
(0.000) 
-0.028 
(0.001) 
0.213 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.748)*** 
-0.213 
(0.000) 
0.168 
(0.000) 
0.168 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.187)*** 
2003 0.117 
(0.000) 
0.117 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.005) 
0.219 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.057)** 
-0.219 
(0.000) 
0.173 
(0.000) 
0.173 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.011)* 
2002 0.109 
(0.000) 
0.109 
(0.000) 
-0.050 
(0.000) 
0.268 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.015)* 
-0.268 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
1. P-value in bracket.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level respectively. 
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Table 3(a) Tests for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (Domestically-owned firms versus Foreign owned and HTM owned firms) 
Foreign vs 
Domestic  
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No 
differences 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
 H1.1:  
Foreign firms 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
2006 0.137 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.291)*** 
-0.137 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.003)*** 
-0.104 
(0.000) 
0.151 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.052)** 
-0.151 
(0.000) 
2005 0.136 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.264)*** 
-0.136 
(0.000) 
0.095 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.012)* 
-0.095 
(0.000) 
0.172 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.203)*** 
-0.172 
(0.000) 
2004 0.150 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.224)*** 
-0.150 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.104 
(0.000) 
0.196 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.687)*** 
-0.196 
(0.000) 
2003 0.156 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.071)** 
-0.156 
(0.000) 
0.106 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.106 
(0.000) 
0.209 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.098)** 
-0.209 
(0.000) 
2002 0.171 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.143)*** 
-0.171 
(0.000) 
0.115 
(0.000) 
0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.115 
(0.000) 
0.207 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.145)*** 
-0.207 
(0.000) 
HTM vs 
Domestic 
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
HTM firms  
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
HTM firms  
dominate 
H1.2: 
Domestic 
firms 
dominate 
2006 0.019 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.750)*** 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
0.053 
(0.000) 
0.053 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.047 
(0.825)*** 
-0.047 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
2005 0.024 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.214)*** 
-0.024 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.845)*** 
0.063 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.160)*** 
-0.063 
(0.000) 
2004 0.051 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.035)* 
-0.051 
(0.000) 
0.035 
(0.000) 
0.035 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.074)** 
0.092 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.166)*** 
-0.092 
(0.000) 
2003 0.050 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.012)* 
-0.050 
(0.000) 
0.052 
(0.000) 
0.052 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.116)*** 
0.106 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.565)*** 
-0.106 
(0.000) 
2002 0.089 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.189)*** 
-0.089 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.016)* 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
0.109 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.426)*** 
-0.109 
(0.000) 
1. P-value in bracket.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level respectively. 
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Table 3(b) Tests for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (HTM owned firms versus Foreign-owned firms) 
HTM vs 
Foreign 
All firms Exporting firms Non-Exporting firms 
H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No 
difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominate 
H1.1:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Foreign firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
HTM firms 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
2006 0.131 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.143 
(0.000) 
0.143 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.027)* 
0.109 
(0.000) 
0.109 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.051)** 
2005 0.117 
(0.000) 
0.117 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.364)*** 
0.121 
(0.000) 
0.121 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.290)*** 
0.115 
(0.000) 
0.115 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.260)*** 
2004 0.102 
(0.000) 
0.102 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.201)*** 
0.104 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.209)*** 
0.120 
(0.000) 
0.120 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000)*** 
2003 0.112 
(0.000) 
0.112 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.235)*** 
0.111 
(0.000) 
0.111 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.597)*** 
0.116 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.012)* 
2002 0.088 
(0.000) 
0.088 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.151)*** 
0.082 
(0.000) 
0.082 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.240)*** 
0.105 
(0.000) 
0.105 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.099)** 
1. P-value in bracket.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% significant level respectively 
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Table 4 Tests for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (Exporter versus Non-exporter) 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
 
All firms 
H0: 
No difference between the two distributions
0.104 
(0.000) 
0.096 
(0.000) 
0.100 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.000) 
 
H1: One 
type 
dominates 
H1.1: 
Exporter dominates 
0.000 
(0.011)* 
0.000 
(0.332)*** 
0.000 
(0.247)*** 
0.000 
(0.858)*** 
0.000 
(0.848)*** 
H1.2:  
Non-exporter dominates 
-0.104 
(0.000) 
-0.096 
(0.000) 
-0.100 
(0.000) 
-0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.116 
(0.000) 
 
SOE 
H0: 
No difference between the two distributions
0.277 
(0.000) 
0.254 
(0.000) 
0.297 
(0.000) 
0.280 
(0.000) 
0.319 
(0.000) 
 
H1: One 
type 
dominates 
H1.1: 
Exporter dominates 
0.001 
(0.312)*** 
0.000 
(0.474)*** 
0.000 
(0.550)*** 
0.000 
(0.499)*** 
0.000 
(0.650)*** 
H1.2:  
Non-exporter dominates 
-0.277 
(0.000) 
-0.254 
(0.000) 
-0.297 
(0.000) 
-0.280 
(0.000) 
-0.319 
(0.000) 
 
Domestic 
H0: 
No difference between the two distributions
0.094 
(0.000) 
0.093 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
0.087 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.000) 
 
H1: One 
type 
dominates 
H1.1: 
Exporter dominates 
0.001 
(0.163)*** 
0.001 
(0.047)* 
0.002 
(0.044)* 
0.000 
(0.312)*** 
0.000 
(0.068)** 
H1.2:  
Non-exporter dominates 
-0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.093 
(0.000) 
-0.083 
(0.000) 
-0.083 
(0.000) 
-0.104 
(0.000) 
 
HTM 
H0: 
No difference between the two distributions
0.040 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.014)* 
 
H1: One 
type 
dominates 
H1.1: 
Exporter dominates 
0.040 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.284)*** 
H1.2:  
Non-exporter dominates 
-0.029 
(0.001) 
-0.013 
(0.069)** 
-0.027 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.798)*** 
-0.017 
(0.057)** 
 
Foreign 
H0: 
No difference between the two distributions
0.030 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.000) 
0.056 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.002) 
 
H1: One 
type 
dominates 
H1.1: 
Exporter dominates 
0.024 
(0.003) 
0.036 
(0.001) 
0.056 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.003) 
H1.2:  
Non-exporter dominates 
-0.030 
(0.001) 
-0.015 
(0.044)* 
-0.001 
(0.083)** 
-0.007 
(0.089)** 
-0.007 
(0.261)*** 
1. P-value in bracket.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% 
significant level respectively. 
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Table 5: Test for Conditional Stochastic Dominance (controlling for possible SOE clustering by 
the share of SOE employees in total industry employment) 
 SOEs vs Non-SOEs SOEs vs Domestic 
H0:  
No difference 
between the two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions  
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Other firms 
dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Other firms 
dominate 
2006  0.204 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.003) 
-0.204 
(0.000) 
0.221 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.004) 
-0.221 
(0.000) 
2005 0.203 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.000) 
-0.203 
(0.000) 
0.221 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.221 
(0.000) 
2004 0.233 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.190)*** 
-0.233 
(0.000) 
0.259 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.028)* 
-0.259 
(0.000) 
2003 0.244 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.061)** 
-0.244 
(0.000) 
0.268 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.065)** 
-0.268 
(0.000) 
2002 0.265 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.019)* 
-0.265 
(0.000) 
0.296 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.296 
(0.000) 
 SOES vs Foreign SOEs vs HTM 
H0:  
No difference 
between the two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates H0:  
No difference 
between the 
two 
distributions 
H1: One type dominates 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2: 
Foreign 
firms 
dominate 
H1.1:  
SOEs 
dominate 
H1.2:  
Foreign 
firms 
dominates 
2006 0.130 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.001) 
-0.130 
(0.000) 
0.245 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.245 
(0.000) 
2005 0.128 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.002) 
-0.128 
(0.001) 
0.234 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.234 
(0.000) 
2004 0.155 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.609)*** 
-0.155 
(0.115) 
0.248 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.846)*** 
-0.248 
(0.000) 
2003 0.166 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.060)** 
-0.166 
(0.022)* 
0.263 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.047)* 
-0.263 
(0.000) 
2002 0.193 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.069)** 
-0.193 
(0.000) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.018)* 
-0.270 
(0.000) 
1. P-value in bracket.  ***, **, * indicates we cannot reject the hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% significant 
level respectively 
 
